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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
are readily distinguishable since they were dealing with situa-
tions in which the injuries, while arising out of a single trans-
action had resulted from separate acts.20 When the court is faced
squarely with the problem it may be that the distinction between
a single and plural intent of the offender may prove a practical
one. It empowers the courts to deal harshly with the offender
who intends multiple injuries or deaths, but would not authorize
cumulative penalties for the offender who did not intend to cause
more than one injury or death.
Hillary Jerrol Crain
CRIMINAL LAW - THEFT - A CAUSE OF ACTION NOT A THING
OF VALUE
Defendant attorney was indicted for theft of a twenty per-
cent interest in a cause of action. The theft was alleged to have
been committed by the use of fraudulent conduct, practices, and
representations in inducing the complainant to sign a contin-
gency fee contract. The contract, which the defendant recorded
and caused to be served on all parties concerned, contained a
provision transferring an interest in the cause to the accused.
It also provided that neither the client nor the defendant could
"settle, compromise, release, or otherwise dispose of" the claim
without the written consent of the other.' The district court
sustained a motion to quash the indictment. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. A cause of action has only a
potential value, thus it is not a thing of value within the re-
quirement of the theft article.2 State v. Picou, 107 So.2d 691
(La. 1958).
formation. The court decided that his objection was premature regardless of the
question of whether a person can be charged with more than one crime when
there has been but one act.
20. The court cited State v. Cannon, 185 La. 395, 169 So. 446 (1936), where
the accused killed two women at the same time and place in "one continuous
transaction" but the homicide did not result from a single act. They also relied on
State v. Monterieffe, 165 La. 296, 115 So. 493 (1928), where there was burglary
followed by larcency involving two separate and distinct acts.
1. This provision was apparently written into the contract pursuant to the
provisions of LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950).
2. The court also held that the indictment failed to allege an intent permanently
to deprive the complainant of part of his cause of action on the date the contract
was entered into. The rationale was that while the theft was alleged in the
indictment to have occurred when the fraudulent conduct was used to procure
the contract, the bill of particulars alleged that the intent permanently to deprive
arose when the contract was recorded, which was 14 days after the alleged theft.
The majority further reasoned that recordation of the contract could not change
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NOTES
The scope of the early common law crime of larceny was
greatly restricted by the courts in order to avoid imposing the
death penalty.8 One method of restricting the scope of the crime
was to limit its subject matter. For example, it was held that a
chose in action could not be the subject of a larceny.4 When the
penalty for larceny was made less severe, the restrictions were
still retained. Consequently, the common law concept of larceny,
which prevailed in Louisiana until 1942,1 was not broad enough
to encompass many situations in which things of value were
stolen. In order to fill this gap, Louisiana prior to 1942 enacted
many special statutes enlarging the subject matter of larceny
to include the stealing of rides on trains, fixtures of locomotives,
electric current, natural gas, cattle, the milk from cattle, auto-
mobile parts, plumbing fixtures, bills and notes, flowers, and
trees.6
A single theft article was enacted in the 1942 Criminal Code
which not only combined the various stealing crimes but also
sought to avoid technical limitations on the subject matter of
theft by providing that it would include "anything of value."' 7
The legislature specifically directed that the phrase "anything
of value" be given the "broadest possible construction, including
any conceivable thing of the slightest value, movable or immov-
able, corporeal or incorporeal, public or private '8 (emphasis
added) and that it "be construed in the broad popular sense of
the phrase."9 Until the instant case arose, the courts apparently
the relationship of the parties since it was binding as between the parties before
recordation. In addition, the court appeared to give great weight to the fact that
the accused relinquished his rights under the contract before any attempt was
made by the complainant to settle the claim.
Although a critical analysis of the above arguments may be justified, the
primary purpose herein is to note the holding that a potential cause of action is
not a thing of value and to investigate whether there was a "taking" of anything
from the complainant.
3. Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code, A Comparison with Prior Louisiana
Criminal Law, 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 6, 37 (1942).
4. See, e.g., Culp v. State, 1 Port. 33, 26 Am. Dec. 357 (Ala. 1834). See also
CLARK AND MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES 717 et seq. (6th ed. 1958).
5. In the Criminal Code of 1942, the three basic stealing crimes of larceny,
embezzlement, and obtaining by false pretenses along with many other statutory
stealing crimes were combined into a single theft article. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950).
6. See the Reporter's comments on the 1942 Criminal Code, 9 WEST'S LA.
STATS. ANNOT. 357 (1951). See also id. at 355, where the special statutes men-
tioned above are listed.
7. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950).
8. LA. R.S. 14:2 (1950).
9. Ibid. The Reporter's comments regarding the phrase "anything of value"
are as follows: "In view of the methods of use of these expressions in the Code,
it is extremely important that they be taken to include as much as possible. They
have been used in place of long enumerations in many articles, and only by ex-
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encountered little difficulty in following this legislative directive
as regards the subject matter of theft. 10
In the instant case, the court was confronted with the state's
contention that the accused attorney committed theft of a twenty
percent interest in a tort action by fraudulently inducing the
complainant to enter into a contingency fee contract relating to
the claim. In quashing the indictment, the court held that the
interest transferred to the defendant had only a potential value
when the contract was entered into, and, since there was nothing
of present value involved, the essential element of a thing of
value was not set forth. The court pointed out that the interest
was neither transferable nor saleable at the time the contract
was completed. The contract was characterized by the court as
a mere employment contract under which the defendant would
have received nothing until he was successful in effecting a re-
covery for the client. This argument appears to rest on the
notion that an accused must have gained something through his
fraud in order to be guilty of theft. However, the only significant
consideration should be whether the victim lost something, not
whether the alleged offender or anyone else gained through the
fraudulent practices." In view of the legislature's avowed in-
tent that "anything of value" be given "the broadest possible
construction,' '1 2 it is logical to assume that the legislature did not
intend to exclude a cause of action as the subject matter of theft.
A person who is deprived of the chance of securing a judgment,
or of negotiating a favorable settlement, would appear to have
lost something of value according to the test set forth by the
legislature. The question of whether or not he would have been
successful should not be considered on a motion to quash the in-
dictment, but should be presented to the jury with instructions
tensive interpretation will this purpose be served." 9 WEST's LA. STATS. ANNOT.
15 (1951).
10. In State v. Mills, 214 La. 979, 39 So.2d 439 (1949), the court held that
steel rails stolen from a bridge were "anything of value" within the meaning of
the theft article. Prior to 1942, it is unlikely that the steel rails would have been
considered the subject of larceny since real property and those movables annexed
to immovables by man so as to acquire the nature of real property could not form
the subject matter of larceny under the common law. See State v. Davies, 22 La.
Ann. 77 (1870).
11. The use of the word "taking" is explained by the Reporter as follows:
"The word 'taking' also has been used advisedly, rather than 'obtain', since the
only significant consideration is whether someone lost, not whether the offender
or anyone else gained by 'obtaining'." 9 WEST's LA. STATS. ANNOT. 359 (1951).
12. LA. R.S. 14:2 (1950).
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to consider that factor in arriving at the actual value of the
thing obtained.13
Although the court apparently regarded the "thing of value"
issue as decisive, it would seem that the crucial issue was whether
there was a "taking" of the cause of action. 14 In order to resolve
that quesion it is necessary to examine the rules governing the
contingency fee contract in Louisiana. If a client forfeits his
right to dispose of his claim independently, by consenting to a
clause waiving that right in the attorney's employment contract,
then it would appear that there was a "taking" in the instant
case. On the other hand, if a client is free to deal with his claim
without the consent of the attorney even in the face of such a
contractual provision, then it would follow that the client loses
no right when he enters the contract. The contingency fee stat-
ute' 5 provides that an attorney may acquire an interest in the
subject matter of a claim by entering into a written contract to
that effect with the client. The statute permits the. inclusion
of a clause providing that neither the attorney nor the client
may dispose of the claim without the written consent of the
other. Finally, it provides that either of the parties to the con-
tract may cause it to be recorded and served on the opposing
party, after which "any settlement, compromise, discontinuance,
or other disposition made of the suit by either the attorney or
the client without the written consent of the other is null and
13. Both the concurring and dissenting opinions disagreed with the majority
statement that the potential cause of action was not a thing of value within the
meaning of the theft article. The concurring opinion stated: "Such a claim is an
incorporeal movable and, if the defendant had taken it by fraud, I think he would
have been subject to prosecution." State v. Picou, 107 So.2d 691 (La. 1958). The
dissenting opinion, after quoting the broad definition of "anything of value" em-
bodied in LA. R.S. 14:2 (1950), stated: "Even though the bill of particulars
stated the value of the thing taken to be unknown as of the date of the taking,
the question of what the value was and whether there was any value, no matter
how slight, was a question of fact and a matter of proof to be established by the
state and to be submitted to the jury." Id. at 698.
14. The concurring opinion, while disagreeing with the majority position that
no thing of value was involved, was nevertheless constrained to sustain the motion
to quash on the basis that there was no taking or misappropriation of the cause
of action by the defendant. This conclusion was based on the theory that the
accused acquired only an irrevocable right to represent the complainant. The
opinion acknowledged that there was a transfer of an interest to the accused but
concluded that it was based on a valid consideration - professional services to be
rendered. It was further stated that the alleged fraud gives rise only to a civil
action for annulment of the contract. However, the fraud contemplated in the
theft article is said by the Reporter to be "intended to produce identity of mean-
ing between civil and criminal fraud." 9 WEST's LA. STATS. ANNOT. 358 (1951).
Thus, if the other premises of the concurring opinion are accepted, the logical
conclusion would be that the indictment alleged the elements of a theft.
15. Supra note 1.
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the suit or claim shall be proceeded with as if no such settlement
or disposition had been made."'16 Since recordation and service
are apparently the events which enable the attorney to prevent
his client and the opponent from entering a valid compromise
agreement without his written consent,"7 it follows that until the
instrument is recorded, the client retains his right to dispose of
the claim, and there has been no taking of part of the cause of
action. However, where the attorney has strictly complied with
the provisions of the contingency fee statute, 8 it appears that he
can render ineffective any attempt by the client to compromise
the claim without his consent. 19 According to this interpretation
of the contingency fee statute, it would appear that a "taking"
was set forth in the indictment since the alleged victim lost his
right to compromise the claim when the accused recorded the
contract and caused it to be served on the proper parties.
The decision in the instant case may have been motivated by
policy considerations. It may be in the best interest of the public
and the legal profession to use the disbarment proceeding 2°
rather than criminal prosecution as a deterrent to fraudulent
conduct on the part of attorneys in connection with contingency
fee contracts. However, that policy consideration was not stated
by the court as a basis for the holding. It is submitted that
further application of the reasoning of the Picou case as to the
subject matter of theft will tend toward an unjustified return
to the troublesome common law distinctions regarding the sub-
16. Supra note 1.
17. See Robinson v. Hunt, 211 La. 1019, 31 So.2d 197 (1946); Succession
of Jones, 193 La. 359, 190 So. 581 (1939) ; McClung v. Atlas Oil Co., 148 La.
674, 87 So. 515 (1921) ; Stiles v. Bruton, 134 La. 523, 64 So. 399 (1914) ; Smith
v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 112 La. 985, 36 So. 826 (1904).
18. Strict compliance with LA. R.S. 37:218 (1.950) apparently requires: (1)
a written contract; (2) a stipulation that neither the attorney nor the client can
dispose of the claim without the written consent of the other; (3) recordation with
the clerk of the district court where the action is to be brought; (4) service of
the opponent with a copy of the contract; and (5) a return of the service as in the
case of ordinary petitions. It appears that the accused in the instant case had
strictly complied with the statute.
19. Robinson v. Hunt, 211 La. 1019, 31 So.2d 197 (1946). See also Stiles v.
Bruton, 134 La. 523, 64 So. 399 (1944). This interpretation of the contingency
fee statute also draws support from the following language, used perhaps un-
wittingly, in the majority opinion: "Apparently the only purpose served by the
recordation was to obtain the protection afforded by LRS 37:218 which is that,
on a compliance with the provisions thereof, any settlement made by one of the
parties to the contract without the written consent of the other would be null and
the claim could thereafter be prosecuted as if no such settlement had been made."
State v. Picou, 107 So.2d 691, 697 (La. 1958).
20. Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Association, Art. XIII,
Discipline and Disbarment of Members, 21 WEST'S LA. STATS. ANNOT. 377 (1951).
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ject matter of theft which the 1942 Criminal Code sought to
eliminate.
J. C. Parkerson
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - STATE CONVICTION SUBSEQUENT TO
FEDERAL ACQUITTAL FOR THE SAME ACT NOT DOUBLE
JEOPARDY OR DUE PROCESS VIOLATION
Defendant was acquitted in federal court for robbery of a
federally insured savings and loan association. Subsequently he
was convicted in a state court under a state robbery statute, the
same conduct being the basis for both prosecutions. On appeal
to the Illinois Supreme Court, defendant pleaded that the former
acquittal was a bar to the subsequent state prosecution, but the
court affirmed the conviction. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether there was a due process
or double jeopardy violation. On rehearing,' held, in a five to
four decision, conviction affirmed. Conviction in a state court
subsequent to an acquittal in a federal court for the same act
is not a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Bartkus v. Illinois, 79 S.Ct. 676 (U.S. 1959).
The problem of dual prosecutions has been presented to the
Supreme Court many times in cases of a federal prosecution
subsequent to a state prosecution for the same act, and the fed-
eral conviction has been upheld. The possibility that the double
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment might apply to such
cases was precluded by the early development of a double sov-
ereignty theory.2 Under this theory the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the offensive conduct may be prosecuted
under both federal and state statutes without violation of double
jeopardy when both sovereignties have separate interests to pro-
tect,3 because such punishments are not two punishments for one
1. Bartkus v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 281 (1958), in which the Illinois Supreme
Court decision was affirmed by an evenly divided court.
2. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852) : "[Every citizen] may
be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for
an infraction of the laws of either .... Yet it cannot be truly averred that the
offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act
he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable. He
could not plead the punishment by one in bar to a conviction by the other."
3. If there is an absence of separate interests, the problem would probably fall
in the area of preemption. See note 5 infra.
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